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I will describe a way of distinguishing between art objects and other In spite of the specificity of the subject matter of the latter, I have often found Wittgenstein's remarks in the former to be more illuminating, because more suggestive, on the topics of art and aesthetics. Also, it is not clear how much weight should be attached to ideas in the Lectures on Aesthetics since Wittgenstein neither organized nor published them himself. However, it is well to note that what he apparently regarded to be the strict subject matter of aesthetics is treated there rather than in the Investigations .
When Wittgenstein talks about aesthetics, he means more than just art.
I will talk almost exclusively about art. Therefore, what Wittgenstein said about aesthetics will here be made appropriate to a discusssion about art.
Although 'art' and 'aesthetics' are often used interchangeably, I will attempt to restrict my use of the term 'aesthetics' to instances where: the use of 'art' is ungrammatical, the topic being discussed is clearly applicable outside the domain of what I will strictly define as art, or I am quoting or referring to something specific that Wittgenstein said.
How do artworks differ from other objects? 1 As physical objects which can be examined for similarities and differences with other physical objects, probably not at all. True, artworks are pieces of canvas pulled taut over wood frames with pigments smeared over them; they are hunks and strands of metal twisted and hung and perched on bases of wood or plaster or stone; they are little circles with variously flagged lines sticking upward or downward out of them, organized on pieces of specially prepared paper so as to signify the possibility of sound. Or, in their performed form, they are the sounds themselves. Non-art objects are generally none of these things. If we recognize something as a painting or a sonata or a sculpture, does that make it art?
These differences between art objects and other objects at the physical level do not seem relevant.
Art objects are things that we do something particular with; namely, we place ourselves in a particular relationship to them, and we do not relate in the same way to non-art objects. We do not try to play this languagegame of calling things the names we have given them. We play it.
What is peculiar about seeing something as something is that such an experience is not part of perception.
It is, in fact, not 'seeing' at all, but is an experience that v/e want to call 'seeing' because it is so similar. We want to say that seeing-as is like seeing, but in an important sense, it is not. The nonperceptual nature of seeing-as can best be explained by giving examples which bring out the contrast between perceptual seeing and seeing-as and their associated verbal and non-verbal reactions.
Imagine that tv/o people have the following similar reactions to Jastrow's duck-rabbit drawing: One person looks, sees the rabbit, and says, 'It's a rabbit*. The second person looks, sees the duck, and then suddenly notices that the picture harbors a rabbit-aspect. He exclaims, 'Mow it's a rabbit!' The first person describes by his utterance what he perceives, which is the rabbit, but only the rabbit-aspect of what we know to be a drawing of a duck-rabbit. Why not simply say the same thing of the second person, that he at first perceives the duck, then the rabbit, and consequently the duck-rabbit? To describe the situation in this way is to fail to confront that fact the something was realized, that an aspect was noticed; more happened than that a series of things was merely perceived. It occurs to us that something has changed, and our first inclination is to attribute this change to the object itself. However, it cannot be anything that the object itself does, for then it would be as if the object altered before our eyes.
The aspect dawns on us. Noticing an aspect, or seeing something as something that it is perceptually not, is something we do.
Interestingly, it follows that the noticing of an aspect often elicits from us not a report of a perception, but an exclamation. We say, 'Oh look, I see this now!' and the ambiguity, as Wittgenstein calls it, of the picture does not escape us, as it escapes the person who merely perceives the rabbit and reports, 'It's a rabbit'. we see art objects as things which they are perceptually not. To say this is not to deny that we perceive them; it is just to acknowledge that it is not for the sake of perception itself that we travel all over the world, among other things, to see them. We seek to experience them. They are more than splotches of color, chunks of metal, human figures leaping across a stage. We see them as more than this. Vie notice things about them, and this is what makes art.
We would treat any ordinary objects in the same way as we treat art objects if there were absolutely no difference between the objects themselves. As I have suggested however, it cannot be their purely physical makeup that distinguishes them. Art objects are fundamentally capable of being seen as what they are perceptually not, and although we regularly notice aspects of ordinary objects as well, I would like to suggest that they do not fundamentally possess the capacity to be seen as what they perceptually are not.
I will thus say that art objects are fundamentally expressive and that this is the objective basis of our taking them as works of art.
Here, as before, we do not need to draw a sharp line between two classes of objects, nor need we ignore the fact that many ordinary objects have expressive capabilities very similar to those of art objects.
What is important is the difference in the way we treat art objects versus other objects, and this mode of treatment, this relationship that we maintain with works of art, is suggestive of the fact that whatever objects we treat in this way are fundamentally capable of being treated in this way. To say that expressiveness is fundamental is not to claim that it is any less the way things just happen to be than any other of our forms of life. It is just to be ready to admit that an expressive quality is the basis of what art is. It is what we expect of artworks.
We must tread carefully when attributing qualities to objects. There is a sense in which Wittgenstein might admit that we can call art objects fundamentally expressive and a sense in which he certainly would not. The physical objects themselves clearly cannot possess the nonobservable property of expressiveness, for what is there in terms of what they physically are is there for all eyes to see. Yet, many people simply do not see the 'expressive character' of various art objects whose aspects are, for one reason or another, opaque to them.
Expressiveness does not reside in art objects, but we've seen that it is partially a function of the way in which we treat these privileged objects. But this is only to consider the point of view of the audience of artworks. The remainder of the story can be gotten by investigating the relationship between art object, expression, and the creator or performer.
An artist creates a work of art in order to bring into being an object which will be part of the exclusive community of objects whose sole purpose for existence is to serve as vehicles for expression.
So expressiveness can in a very vivid sense be said to inhere in works of art; they are created to be taken as expressive by the community. A performer, likewise, seeks to bring to the audience the expressive character of a work.
Here it is not important what an artist wants his work to express or whether he is capable of making it express anything in particular. Much of the intent behind artistic creation is to bring forth objects of which people will notice aspects, i.e. which v/ill be seen as things that they are perceptually not. So not only is this the way in which art is received; it is also the way in which it is given. Art objects have, as the motivation behind their creation, a fundamental expressivity.
It is not by way of their physical being that artworks are expressive.
It is by way of their playing a certain role in the community, of fulfilling the needs and expectations of both the artist and the audience, and of being the crux of the form of life we call aesthetics. Thus, art objects as art are not identical with the physical objects that they also are.
The distinction between physical art objects and artworks might erroneously give rise to the picture form. An art object must first of all be perceived in order for it to even be possible for it to be art.
Perception is the foundation for all of our interpretations, for the dawning of every aspect upon us, for the seeing of every artwork as something, for taking it in a certain way. Art object and artwork are the same thing, yet different in character. Perception and seeing-as are different games. What v/e see art objects as are works of art, and this is the first game we play with these particular physical objects.
When a person perceives a physical object which is expressively an artwork, and yet does not take it expressively, but sees only the physical object and is only able to report on its existence, to describe it, then we must say that this object is not art for this person at this time.
Alternative interpretations of such cases are unrealistic in the sense that they are not accommodated by our language-games. What if we instead say that anything which the community calls art (or which the artist calls a work of art) is art for everyone at all times? We are then left with a group of purely physical objects which may or may not have any experiential significance for any given person at any given time. Art which is just called art is no longer fundamentally expressive.
It has lost its meaning, and we are left with a useless and inappropriate distinction between one type of object and all others, where there once existed the useful and appropriate distinction between those -objects which have a fundamentally expressive character which is capable of being grasped by some portion of the community, and those objects which do not have a fundamentally expressive character.
Because it is the most in conformity with our actual practice, the most realistic way to treat cases in which a particular person does not take an art object expressively at a given time, is to say that that wox We are familiar with the concept of seeing art objects as art. The primary sense in which the concept of seeing-as enters into a discussion of art is the general sense in which art objects are seen as expressive will differ for each member of the community. Recall that expressivity does not define the art object because 1) not all objects which a person will admit to be art have an expressive character for that person, and 2) expressivity is a non-physical property which the physical art object cannot possess. The seeing of art objects as art, the recognizing of certain art objects that they are art, is the first aspect which must be noticed about an artwork if any further aesthetic appreciation is to ensue. Wittgenstein does not directly address this issue, however his comments on aesthetic appreciation are enlightening.
The members of an audience exhibit different degrees of appreciation of a work of art.
The uninteresting, because uninformed reaction of some is a simple 'Ah' or 'Oh'. Those who are familiar with the art form or the particular work will be able to say much more, and consequently will be able to make judgements about the work.
If there were no question of not seeing art objects as art, then what was art would be art for everyone. There would be different degrees of discerning tastes but all tastes would be discerning and every judgement would be valid, informed, a legitimate show of appreciation.
Further, no one would be able to admit, 'That is not art for me!'. The expression would have no sense. What would the significance of the expressive character of art then be? Artworks could not be artworks because of their fundamental expressivity, for expressiveness is an aspect of something which has to be taken. If art objects just were art and were not taken to be so by anyone, then either artworks could not be fundamentally expressive, in which case it would be hard to see what their being art consisted in, or their expressivity would be irrelevant to their being art, in which case it would be difficult to see what possible function their expressivity could have.
Wittgenstein does not discuss whether or how we take art objects as art, but his views on aesthetics which emerge in the context of his discussion of seeing-as are conducive to an adoption of the view that art is art because art objects are taken aesthetically by the community; this shows by way of the fact that aesthetic appreciation is a language-game that we do play, and aesthetics is a form of life which v/e do have. In many cases, the examples he provides are not intended to specifically illustrate a point about art or aesthetics. Yet they have a curiously aesthetic sense, which is highlighted by the occasional references to music, poetry, and the pervasiveness of the ideas of pictures and drawings.
Here it occurs to me that in conversations on
Wittgenstein's discussion of seeing, and "the difference of category between the two 'objects' of sight" (Philosophical Investigations, p. 193) serves as an excellent springboard for aesthetic indulgences.
Simply seeing a work of art and seeing it as something are two entirely different modes of apprehending the art object.
In the first instance, the artwork is merely a perceived object, and the viewer might be able to produce a description, a drawing, or a copy of what is perceived. A copy or a description is, in fact, all that could be expected from a person who could in no sense be said to understand the artwork, who could produce no verbal or gestural signals of having truly appreciated it by way of making judgements about it based on his familiarity with works of its type, or works produced by the same culture or during the same age. It's lovely!'. Uninformed reactions may be positive, negative, or neither. Clearly, these art objects have not been taken as art by their viewers. They have simply been perceived and the result is some description which serves as a copy or which replicates in words what the viewer has seen (or heard), but no more. These are the kinds of things that we expect people to say when an artwork has made no impression on them, when their seeing has not been seeing-as. They have noticed no aspects about the art object, or at least none that convince them of its status as art. Remember Jastrow's duck-rabbit and the person who 'notices' the rabbit and remarks, 'It's a rabbit?'. The person has not noticed the rabbit-aspect however, but has merely seen the rabbit. The ambiguity of the picture is thus lost upon him.
It is easy to think of examples
Likewise here, a person may accidently, as it were, 'notice an aspect' of a work of art. A John Cage piece, for example, may consist of* a series of notes arranged according to no prior 'sense', and to truly notice this would be an astute observation. But for the person who unwittingly reports upon it as upon a perception, it will not be as if he has noticed an aspect. That was merely what he perceived when he viewed the art object, and was certainly no manifestation of his seeing the art object as a work of art.
There is a continuity between the above-given descriptions, which might be made by art viewers perceiving art objects without seeing them as art, and the examples of primitive or unappreciative reactions to art objects that Wittgenstein actually provides in the Lectures on Aesthetics. Nonappreciative gaping perhaps accompanied by uninformed comments such as 'Oh!', 'Ah!', 'How marvellous!', or 'How awful!' (a possible uninformed reaction to a Picasso or a Dali, or perhaps a musical composition on synthesizer), are similarly indicative of the fact that a person has not really appreciated the artistry of an art object.
In fact, if such a person were asked to elaborate on his initial primitive reaction, he might respond with such descriptions as appear in the previous paragraph. In other words, uninformed art viewers are unlikely to be able to articulate more than a series of unappreciative reactions to works of art, even if pressed.
In order to see in exactly what sense these cases can be said to be cases of persons not seeing art objects as art, not noticing aspects of the artworks except accidently, it will be useful to examine what sorts of reactions will count as cases of genuine appreciation.
It is because a person can see an art object as an artwork that he is able to notice aspects of that artwork, to see it as things that it perceptually is not. An aspect can never be noticed if the art object is not first taken as art, for then there is no noticing by the viewer but only perceiving, out of which a mere description or replication of the perception in words or drawings can ensue. Supporting this claim are two assumptions:
1) The noticing of aspects of artworks is derivative of their status as art, 2) If an aspect of an artwork is noticed, and it is not derivative of the status of the object as art, then that aspect is irrelevant to the artistic value of the work.
It is only outside of the strict boundaries of perception that noticing can take place, because only there can it be said that something is, in fact, noticed rather than perceived.
I appeal here to Wittgenstein's idea that to understand the difference between two concepts, we must examine how we use those concepts, and the language-games that we play with them, and that this in turn depends upon how we have learned them. We find these cases puzzling because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough.
Wittgenstein says this in opposition to the several unreflective ideas which have come to surround the concept of seeing and other related concepts. He spends the. bulk of the Investigations attempting to undermine these ideas. A study of the depth grammar of 'seeing' leads him to replace our unreflective ideas with the very plausible accounts of seeing and seeing-as. They are so different from one another, and yet we want to call them such similar names. We must not let our grammar confuse us. There is no need for us to be puzzled by our ability to make comparisons and see similarities. We do these things because we are able to notice aspects, and this can only take place against some background. We must know our way about. There need be no puzzles.
In the realm of aesthetics, imponderable numbers of complexities enter into our noticing aspects of works of art, for our ways of living pervade our noticing and even influence our ability to see art objects as art. Why should it puzzle us that we see a similarity between the style of musician and the style of a poet who lived at the same time, that we find, for example, certain themes of Aspect-blindness is a purely hypothetical idea. Wittgenstein conjures up the concept to make a point, and clearly does not v/ant to push it any farther than is necessary, because in a culture with our forms of life, and the language-games we play, I think he would admit that it is a conceptual impossibility. Yet the concept is illustratively effective. We are not aspect-blind; we notice aspects. We see things as things that they perceptually are not. One of the things that we do, in fact, see things as, is art.
Thus, seeing art objects as art is part of our culture. It is a form of life for us. Art (aesthetics) is intimately intertwined with other forms of life, so that to understand art, or to experience it with some degree of informed appreciation, we have to understand many things about the way that we live. We notice aspects of the artworks we experience because or if we have a background through which we can appreciate them, through which they are familiar to us. So we play our language-games of appreciation and we make gestures and comparisons, and we notice relationships and similarities, and thus art, for us, is alive.
It is expressive.
If we take it as expressive, it never leaves us untouched.
Wittgenstein may not have solved all philosophical
problems, but what he has lighted upon, he has made simple.
Here I have tried to show the simplicity of a theory of art which can be developed from an extension of several of his central ideas.
Its simplicity lies in showing how confusions about art are conceptual, thus leaving the complexity and beauty of aesthetic experience untouched.
NOTES
"Art' and 'art object' will be strictly dichotomized, and defined shortly.
'Artwork' will at times seem to vacillate in meaning between these two poles; however, I mean by this term the physical art object which is accepted as art. Its use is consistent with this definition which will be elaborated upon.
